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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this thesis, we detect attacks targeting the cluster based QOLSR model in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks (MANETs). The QOLSR is a multimedia protocol that was designed on top of the 
Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR), where the Quality of Service (QoS) of the nodes is 
considered during the selection of the Multi-Point Relay (MPRs) nodes. One of the drawbacks of 
this protocol is network lifetime where nodes with limited energy and high bandwidth may be 
selected to serve as MPRs, which drain nodes’ residual energy and shorten the network lifetime. 
Thus, in this thesis, we consider the trade-off between extending the lifetime of ad hoc network 
and QoS assurance based on QOLSR routing protocol. We can accomplish the following by (1) 
decreasing the number of Multi-Point Relay (MPR) nodes without sacriﬁcing the QoS and (2) 
observing the energy level, connectivity index, and bandwidth of the MPR nodes. We can reach 
these goals by deploying the clustering model to QOLSR. Therefore, a new clustering approach 
and MPR selection process are proposed relying on different combinations of metrics, such as 
connectivity, residual energy, and bandwidth. Four clustered-based models are derived. 
Moreover, the cluster-based models are highly vulnerable to security attacks. Two attacks that 
can be launched against the QoS-OLSR protocol where identiﬁed: Identity spooﬁng and worm-
hole attacks. Watchdogs are used to detect the attacks performed by malicious nodes. As a 
solution, we propose to improve the watchdogs’ detection by (1) using cooperative watch-dog 
model and (2) adding the posterior belief function using Bayes’ rule to the watchdog model. 
Simulation results are generated in order to evaluate the efﬁciency of our proposed approaches.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Quality of Service (QoS), Head Election, MPR Selection, Ad Hoc Networks, Mobility, 
Identity Spoofing Attack, Wormhole Attack, Posterior Belief Function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of contents
Chapter Page
I - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Motivations and Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Approach Overview and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
II - Background and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Ad-hoc Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 MANET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Security in MANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Cooperative Watchdogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 Bayesian Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.7.1 Clustering in MANET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7.2 Security in MANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
III-A Cluster-Based Model for QoS-OLSR Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Cluster-Based QoS-OLSR Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.1 Quality of Service Metric Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.2 Cluster Head Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.3 MPR Nodes Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.4 Illustrative Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.1 Percentage of MPR nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.2 Network Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.3 End-to-End Average Delay in the Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.4 The Bandwidth Average Difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
IV-Detecting Attacks in a Mobile Cluster-Based QoS-OLSR Protocol . . . . . . 41
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
vii
4.2 Security Attacks in a QoS-OLSR Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.1 Illustrative Example: QoS-OLSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.2 Identifying the Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3 Cooperative Detection Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.1 How watchdog is working . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.2 How to improve detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4 Simulation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4.1 Effect of Identity Spoofing and Wormhole Attacks on the Network . . . 53
4.4.2 Probability of Detecting Attacks and False Rate With Different Per-
centage of Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
V - Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
viii
List of Figures
1 Ad hoc network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Watchdog example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Network example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4 Percentage of MPR Nodes: (a) B-OLSR (b) Proportional B-OLSR (c) BE-
OLSR (d) Proportional BE-OLSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5 Percentage of of alive nodes over time: (a) B-OLSR (b) Proportional B-
OLSR (c) BE-OLSR (d) Proportional BE-OLSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6 Average Path Length with and without Clustering: (a) B-OLSR (b) Propor-
tional B-OLSR (c) BE-OLSR (d) Proportional BE-OLSR . . . . . . . . . . 37
7 Attack Network example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8 Wormhole Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9 Percentage of disconnected clusters with 10% attackers: (a) Identity Spoof-
ing Attack (b) Wormhole Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10 Percentage of disconnected clusters with different percentage of attackers:
(a) Identity Spoofing Attack (b) Wormhole Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
11 Detection percentage with different percentage of attackers: (a) Identity
Spoofing Attack (b) Wormhole Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
12 False detection percentage with different percentage of attackers: (c) Iden-
tity Spoofing Attack (d) Wormhole Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
ix
List of Tables
1 Quality of Service Metric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2 The Quality of Service Metric Using the Proportional BE-OLSR Model . . 33
3 Simulation Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4 Bandwidth Average Difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5 The Quality of Service Metric Using the Hybrid QoS-OLSR Model . . . . 43
6 Simulation Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
x
Chapter One
Introduction
1.1 Motivations and Problem Statement
Mobile ad hoc network(MANET) [26] is a guaranteed technology for the growth of wire-
less networks. It relies on a self-configuring and easily deployed network without depend-
ing on any fixed infrastructure. MANET is applied in several real world applications where
the topology of the network is changed frequently. In MANETs, nodes communicate and
send packets to each others through routing.
Routing is the mechanism of exchanging information between the nodes in ad hoc
network [27] and forwarding packets from a source towards its destination through the
optimal path. The efficiency of a route can be measured by different metrics(i.e., number
of hops in a path, minimum delay, maximum bandwidth, etc). Most routing protocols
for MANETs are designed without taking into consideration the Quality of Service of the
routes generated. In such protocols, the only metric considered for routing is the number
of hops. One the proposed routing protocols is OLSR.
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The Optimized Link State Routing, known as OLSR [7], is a proactive routing method
for mobile ad hoc networks. This protocol is based on MPR (MultiPoint Relay) nodes that
transmit the topology control information of the network and forward packets from source
to destination. Relying on OLSR, Quality of Service (QoS) OLSR protocol, known as
QOLSR [3], was proposed in literature to consider nodes’ available bandwidth during the
MPR and optimal routing paths selection. The protocol was designed to handle multimedia
applications over ad hoc networks. The delay and bandwidth metrics that satisfy Quality
of Service are considered during the selection of MPR.
The QOLSR protocol [10] has a main limitation that can ultimately jeopardize the ulti-
mate goal of the protocol, where the lifetime of the network can be shorter due to selecting
a large number of MPRs. In fact, in QOLSR protocol, every node in the network selects
its own set of MPRs independently. Due to this problem, nodes’ available bandwidth is
affected and the possibility of channel collision is increased, especially in the dense net-
works.
Moreover, several attacks can be launched against the proposed clustering model. Thus,
a security mechanism should be provided for any cluster-based model. In fact, normal
nodes or MPR nodes in any cluster can behave maliciously. They can broadcast fake Topol-
ogy Control (TC) messages since security is not ensured.
Topology control (TC) messages are transmitted to ensure the fresh-path selection in the
network. In QoS-OLSR, head nodes are responsible of exchanging topology information
between the clusters, and only MPR nodes are responsible of exchanging TC messages
each time the network topology is changed.
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Being a mobile and wireless network, QOLSR is more susceptible to attacks than nor-
mal networks. Attacks against the network can be performed each time the TC messages
are exchanged. These attacks can lead to network disruptions that can eventually threaten
the ultimate goal of the protocol.
The following objectives must be ensured in order to maintain the stability and secu-
rity of the network. First, a trade-off between reducing the percentage of MPR nodes and
maintaining good Quality of Service metrics(i.e., residual energy level, connectivity index,
and bandwidth) should be considered during the formation of clusters. Second, the attacks
performed against this cluster-based model should be identified and detected. While de-
tecting the attacks, normal and MPR nodes should be monitored because they might be
malicious. In addition, watchdogs themselves could be malicious ending up giving false
detection decisions. The malicious watchdog may accuse a node that is not malicious to be
misbehaving
In this context, many clustering algorithms have been proposed [1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 13].
However, the approaches select a large number of MPR nodes, which can shorten network
lifetime, affect nodes’ available bandwidth and increase the risk of channel collisions. Also,
in some methods, MPRs are selected based on nodes’ bandwidth without considering other
metrics.
In addition, several approaches have been proposed to detect the misbehaving nodes
[14–23]. The existing methods suppose that each node can act as a watchdog and monitor
the performance of its neighbors. In fact, this node can be selfish or malicious and hence
give false results. A malicious watchdog may accuse normal nodes to be misbehaving
unjustly. Moreover, it can also predict that a malicious node is not misbehaving in order to
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help this node launch its attack. Therefore, the decision of a single monitor is not enough
in order to evaluate the behavior of the nodes in the network. Based on this, the accuracy of
detection results will decrease and the false detection rates will increase. Thus, a bayesian
cooperative approach [31] is proposed in order to enhance the detection, give more accurate
results, and reduce the false detection rates.
In summary, the following are the problems listed in this thesis:
 Low Quality of Service due to the high numbers of MPRs.
 Misbehaving and malicious nodes that can launch attacks against the network.
1.2 Objectives
The main purpose of this thesis is to develop a cluster based QoS-OLSR model that main-
tains high Quality of Service, identifies the attacks that can target this clustered model and
ensures the security of this model by detecting these attacks. In summary, the objectives of
our approach can be listed as follows:
 Reducing the percentage of MPR nodes without sacrificing the Quality of Service
metrics.
 Improving the detection of misbehaving nodes and the false detection rates by using
a bayesian cooperative detection approach.
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1.3 Approach Overview and Contributions
In this thesis, we propose a clustering model, where nodes can cooperatively select a set
of heads to serve as MPRs. Once the head nodes are elected and consequently clusters are
formed, the elected nodes will cooperatively select the set of MPRs that can connect these
clusters. In literature, clustering in OLSR has been proposed as a solution for prolonging
the network lifetime, by reducing the percentage of MPRs, where clusters are formed and
then MPRs are selected according to their metrics such as residual energy or connectivity
degree [12,13]. All the proposed models assume the presence of clustering models that can
cluster the network, while the MPRs are selected afterwards. While in our model, the heads
are selected cooperatively, then they will select the MPRs that can connect the heads with
each others into 1-hop, 2-hop, and 3-hop away. In this context, we propose a solution that
has four different clustering models based on three metrics: bandwidth, connectivity index
and residual energy. To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any work done that
considers the tradeoff, for QOLSR, between network lifetime and QoS based on clustering.
Simulation results show that the novel cluster based approach is able to prolong network
lifetime by selecting less number of MPRs, thus decreasing traffic overhead, delay, channel
collision, and increasing cooperation in the network.
Moreover, to deal with the security of our clustering model, we identify two attacks that
can be launched against QoS-OLSR protocol: Identity spoofing and wormhole attacks. In
the identity spoofing attack, the attacker sends fake TC messages by spoofing the identity
of another node, which will lead to disconnected clusters in the network. In the wormhole
attack, a malicious node copies the TC message of an MPR node and sends it to another
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attacker through the wormhole tunnel which will lead to fake path selection. These attacks
may lead to network disruptions. Therefore, a detection approach is proposed in order
to identify the malicious nodes in the network. To detect the above attacks, we propose
the use of watchdogs. To enhance the detection, we propose a solution based on coop-
erative watchdogs that will monitor the attackers. The final decision is calculated by the
aggregation function that considers the reputation used in QoS-OLSR. MPR nodes are the
only nodes selected as watchdogs in our model, because TC messages are exchanged only
by the MPRs. Then Bayes’ rule function [31], which calculates the posterior belief of a
node being misbehaving based on observations, will be added to our cooperative model
in order to improve the overall detection. Simulation results are conducted to evaluate the
performance of adding Bayes’ rule function to the cooperative watchdog model.
The contributions of the thesis are summarized as follows:
 Introducing a novel clustered based QoS-OLSR approach that prolongs the network
lifetime by reducing the number of MPR nodes, which decreases the the risk of
channel collisions and the possibility of traffic overhead.
 Selecting the MPRs cooperatively based on nodes’ QoS metric(i.e., residual energy
level, connectivity index, and bandwidth) using MPR nodes selection algorithm.
 Detecting the attacks launched against the QoS-OLSR using an improved cooperative
watchdog model that gives more accurate results.
 Reducing false positives where malicious nodes are mistakenly or intentionally con-
sidered as normal nodes by adding the posterior belief function using Bayes’ rule to
the watchdog model.
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1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter [2], we present the main ideas provided in the thesis: ad-hoc network,
MANET, security in MANET, cooperative watchdogs and bayesian rule. Then, we pro-
vide the related works in the areas of clustering and detecting attacks against QOLSR.
In Chapter [3], we propose our clustering approach. We develop a cluster head election
and MPRs selection algorithms in order to form our clusters. Then, we give an illustrative
example to show how these algorithms work. Finally, we present the simulation results that
evaluate the efficiency of the proposed cluster based QoS-OLSR model.
In Chapter [4], we identify the security attacks that can be launched against our QoS-
OLSR protocol along with a network example in order to show how the attacks can be
launched. Then, we present the bayesian cooperative detection model that is proposed
to detect these attacks. Finally, we simulate the effect of the attacks and the detection
algorithm applied to the clustering QoS-OLSR model.
In Chapter [5], we conclude the thesis, recapitulate its contributions, state the future
works, and provide the publications derived from this thesis.
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Chapter Two
Background and Related Work
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an overview about the concepts that form our models. We introduce
first ad-hoc networks and talk about their characteristics. Then, we describe MANETs and
the security concerns in these networks. Moreover, the thesis uses watchdogs to detect the
attacks that can be lauched against the QoS-OLSR protocol. To enhance this detection, we
propose a cooperative watchdog theory to make the final decision based on an aggregation
function. In order to improve the overall detection, we add the Bayes-rule function which
calculates the posterior belief of a node being misbehaving based on observations. In this
context, we give a definition of the Bayes rule and show the importance of this method.
Finally, a summary of the related works in the fields of clustering and detecting attacks in
MANETs is provided.
8
2.2 Ad-hoc Network
An ad hoc network [28] is a set of two or more nodes that compose a network and com-
municate with each other without the need of centralized access points or base stations.
Unlike conventional networks, it does not rely on any fixed infrastructure and can be de-
ployed easily and with relatively low cost.
Figure 1 represents a peer-to-peer multihop ad hoc network. It begins with at least
Fig. 1: Ad hoc network
a communication between two nodes broadcasting topology control messages including
their respective address information. If two nodes are neighbors, then they can directly
send messages to each others. They should both update their routing tables. For example,
node A communicates directly with node B because they are neighbors. If two nodes are
not neighbors, multi-hop communication is needed. The intermediate nodes between these
two nodes should route the packet. Another example is when A wants to communicate with
C. It can’t do this directly, node B or nodes D and E should act as routers.
Ad hoc networks history [28] started in 1972, when the US Department of Defence,
DARPA, initiated a packet radio network (PRNet) research recognizing packet switching
in order to provide reliable computer communication. The advantage of packet switching
is the dynamic sharing of bandwidth among multiple users. Then, in 1983, Survivable
Radio Network (SURAN) was built, followed by several ad hoc networks developed in
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1994 under the Global Mobile Information Systems program (GloMo). SURAN improved
by making the radios cheaper, smaller, and power consumers. In the beginning of 1990s,
notebook computers, open source softwares and viable communications equipment based
on infrared and RF have emerged.
Being dynamic and self-organized, ad hoc networks are functional in many applications
where rapid deployment is required or when network infrastructure is very costly to man-
age [29]. These applications include:
Commercial Area: Ad hoc networks are employed in emergency services. As an ex-
ample, workers in a field who communicate with each others in a disaster area(e.g., fie,
flood, earthquake) and share video updates of specific locations and send the information
to headquarters over a small hand held. Armed forces also use ad hoc networks by creating
a tactical network in an unfamiliar territory in order to communicate and distribute situa-
tional awareness information.
Local level: Ad hoc networks are also used to spread and exchange information over an in-
stant and temporary multimedia network. For example, they are used in conference rooms
where people share some files via notebooks or handheld devices. Another example of
local networks is home or office networks where the devices share information by commu-
nicating directly. Moreover, ad hoc networks can be used in civilian environments such as
taxicab, boat, and aircraft.
Personal Area Network: Ad hoc networks simplify the communication between several
mobile devices like PDAs, laptops and cellular phones. Wireless connections are used in-
stead of wired cables.
Military Battlefield: The military use ad hoc networks in order to sustain an information
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network between its headquarters, soldiers and vehicles.
Ad hoc networks are classified into four categories depending on their coverage area:
Body networks, personal networks, Local networks, and Wide Area Networks [29]. The
main characteristics of ad hoc networks include the following:
Mobility: In ad hoc networks, nodes can rapidly change position and move in the network
depending on specific direction and speed. This will result in constantly changing net-
work topologies. Therefore, mobility may affect the network performance and the routing
method selection.
Multihop routing: Multihopping is revealed in networks where there are multi paths from
source to destination. Multihop network is often used for energy consumption, obstacle
negotiation and spectrum reuse.
Self-organization: There is a lack of pre-configuration in ad hoc networks. Thus, the net-
work should be dynamically and automatically managed. All the configuration parameters
like clustering, path routing, nodes position and and energy control should be autonomously
determined.
Resource limited devices: Most of the nodes in an ad hoc network have limited energy
and are not able to generate their own power.
Resource limited communications: This is due to the fact that many nodes in the network
use the radio medium at the same time.
Scalability: Hierarchical construction handle the scalability in networks that are based on
a fixed infrastructure. Local handoff and Mobile IP methods are also used to deal with
the limited mobility in infrastructure based networks. Whereas, fixed hierarchical structure
cannot be used in ad hoc networks because of the absence of any fixed infrastructure and
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the wide mobility level in the network.
Potentially large networks: A network could have of a huge number of nodes. For exam-
ple, a network of sensors that consists of thousands of mobile nodes.
2.3 MANET
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) [26] is a wireless network consisting of mobile nodes
that exchange information without base stations regardless of their geographical location.
They do not have any established infrastructure, and they have constrained bandwidth and
energy and dynamic topologies. Nodes that are neighbors can communicate directly with
each others over wireless links, and those that are not neighbors use MPR nodes in order to
exchange information. The nodes are able to join, leave or move in the network; thus The
network topology changes constantly.
In MANET, network configuration and message transfer should be performed by the
nodes themselves because the network is decentralized. Message routing is an issue in
decentralized environments where the network topology changes. In addition, the optimal
path from source to destination in MANET is not the shortest route as in static networks.
MANET introduces several challenges [26] which include:
Quality of Service: The characteristics of MANETS make it difficult to guarantee the ser-
vices that should be offered to the nodes in the network. Thus, in order to support these
services, QoS must be ensured.
Routing: The problem of routing in MANETs is an important challenge because the net-
work topology is changing frequently. Packets delivery should be ensured between the
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nodes at source and destination. Paths between nodes may consist of multiple hops, which
is more difficult than the single hop communication.
Reliability and Security: Reliability problems are introduced in ad hoc networks due
to the the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, limited wireless transmission range,
mobility nature of the network and data transmission errors. In addition, MANETs are
susceptible to many attacks that could be launched against the nodes in the network. Thus,
security should also be ensured in these networks.
Power Consumption: Energy conservation and energy-aware routing should be consid-
ered in MANET. The communication operations should be optimized in order to consume
power in MANETs.
Multicast: The multicast routing protocol must should support mobility.
Location-Aided Routing: The associated areas are identified by using nodes position in-
formation so that routing will be limited and spatially oriented.
2.4 Security in MANETs
Being mobile and dynamic wireless networks, MANETs are more susceptible to malicious
attacks than static networks. Moreover, due to their open medium and dynamic network
topology, MANETs are vulnerable to several types of attacks such as impersonation, pas-
sive eavesdropping and denial of service. A malicious node is able to destroy the commu-
nication between two nodes by claiming to have another’s node identity, sending incorrect
link state information and broadcasting false routing information.
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The main challenges ad concerns to be considered in MANET security are [26]:
Lack of centralized management: MANET does not rely on a centralized infrastructure.
Monitoring all the nodes and detecting malicious attacks in a large mobile network is diffi-
cult due to the absence of centralized management.
Resource availability: Ensuring secure communication in dynamic networks and protect-
ing against malicious nodes leads to maintain security mechanisms.
Scalability: The network topology changes every period of time because of the mobility
of nodes. Thus, scalability is a major issue for securing MANET. The security schemes
should be able to handle small and large networks.
Cooperation: Nodes in ad hoc network are assumed to be trusted and cooperative. Thus, a
misbehaving node can easily disrupt the network functions by launching a harmful attack.
Dynamic network topology: Changing network topology may affect the trust relationship
between the nodes. Therefore, an adaptive security mechanism should be proposed in order
to handle the dynamic behavior.
Limited energy: Nodes in a mobile ad hoc network may act in a selfish way in order to
save its power.
Attackers inside the network: Nodes in a mobile network can easily join or leave the net-
work. Attacks may be launched by insiders and outsiders. But attacks launched by nodes
inside the network are more dangerous than external attacks; therefore, detection mecha-
nisms should be proposed to detect the misbehaving nodes inside the network.
No predefined boundary: Nodes in MANET are free to join and leave the network. There
is no predefined physical boundary that control nodes’ movement. Thus, when a malicious
node joins the network, it can easily communicate with other nodes and launch an attack
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such as: eavesdropping, spoofing, replay, wormhole and denial of service attacks.
One way of securing a mobile ad hoc network is by applying detection and preven-
tion methods like authentication and encryption approaches, however, experiments have
demonstrated that these methods are not sufficient. Therefore, intrusion detection systems
are needed to defend against the malicious attacks.
There are number of attacks that can affect MANETs [26]:
Denial of service: The availability of a node or the entire network is attacked. The attack
uses radio jamming and battery exhaustion techniques.
Impersonation: A malicious node can spoof the identity of another node. Thus, it can
monitor the network traffic, send fake information to the network and have access to confi-
dential information.
Eavesdropping: The malicious node gains access to the confidential information such as
node’s location, public and private key, and password.
Routing attacks: This attack aims at blocking the broadcast of routing information to a
node in the network. It can also disturb the delivery of packets against a predefined path.
Jamming: The malicious node verifies the frequency at which the destination node is re-
ceiving the signal from the sender by monitoring the wireless medium. It then uses this
frequency in order to transmit signals and cause errors.
Man in the middle: A malicious node stands between the sender and the receiver and
steals the information exchanged. It can also spoof the identity of the sender and commu-
nicate with the receiver.
Security in MANETs is an essential component for basic network functions such as
sending control messages, packet forwarding and routing. Such networks also have high
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communication overhead because nodes send periodic control messages each time the net-
work topology changes. Unlike traditional networks that use specific trusted nodes to sup-
port basic functions, in ad hoc networks, those functions are used by all the available nodes.
These nodes could be malicious and therefore launch attacks against the protocol. In order
to secure mobile ad hoc networks, early detection of attacks against the network should be
applied.
2.5 Cooperative Watchdogs
Watchdogs are the nodes responsible of monitoring the behavior of the various nodes in the
network. It is a well-known intrusion detection mechanism that detects attacks launched by
selfish and malicious nodes against the network [30]. When the source node sends a packet,
the watchdog listens to the transmissions of the next node in the path in order to verify that
this node broadcasts the packet correctly. If not, then this node is identified as malicious.
Such systems can then isolate or penalize misbehaving nodes by reducing their reputation
(i.e., trust rates). Thus, watchdogs overhear the transmissions of all next nodes in the route.
After monitoring the behavior of its neighbors, the watchdog can decide wether a node is
selfish or malicious. Figure 2 shows an example of the watchdog behavior:
Suppose that node A needs to forward a message to node D. It can send this message
through path A-B-C-D or path A-M-D. The watchdog can listen to the packets sent by B
and M who are in range of A. Suppose node M is malicious. If route A-B-C-D is chosen,
then B sends all the packets to C which forwards them to D. Else, if route A-M-D is chosen,
then an attack is performed and all the received packets are dropped. When M does not
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Fig. 2: Watchdog example
forward the packet, the watchdog knows it and identifies node M as malicious.
Another issue is the false detection decision that could be taken by watchdogs. Nodes
mobility and collisions reduce the accuracy of the detection results and leads watchdogs to
provide false positives and false negatives decisions. This will lead to network disruptions
because some malicious nodes are mistakenly identified as normal trusted nodes, and some
normal nodes are identified as attackers. One way to improve detection and reduce the
detection time of malicious nodes is the use of collaborative watchdog. The watchdogs
cooperate together in order to improve their individual and collective performance. The
cooperative model also decreases the false negatives and false positives rates.
2.6 Bayesian Rule
The Bayesian rule is a mathematical theorem provided by Thomas Bayes. It explains how
the existing beliefs should be changed in the light of new evidence. This theory has been
used in a wide variety of contexts such as developing Bayesian spam blockers for email
systems and marine biology. In the scheme of science, bayes’ rule was useful in clarifying
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the link between theory and evidence. Several approaches such as confirmation, falsifi-
cation, relation between science and pseudoscience, etc. were made more accurate, and
enlarged or corrected, by the use of Bayes’ method.
Bayes rule [31] calculates the estimation probability that a hypothesis H is true in the
light of evidence E. Let (1) P(H) be the prior belief of the probability that hypothesis H is
true before the observation of E; (2) P(H|E) is the conditional likelihood that E will occur
given that H is true; (3) P(E|H) is the probability of observing evidence E given H; and (4)
P(E) is the marginal probability of E. Then, the posterior probability of hypothesis H given
the evidence E is:
P (HjE) = P (EjH) P (H)
P (E)
(1)
As an example, a given population is 40% boys and 60% girls. 30% of the boys like to
play football but only 10% of the girls like to play football.
The probability that a person randomly chosen is a boy:
P(boy) = 40% of the entire population
The probability that a person randomly chosen is a girl:
P(girl) = 60% of the entire population
Probability of picking at random from the set of boys someone who likes to play football:
P(football | boy) = 30%
Probability of picking at random from the set of girls someone who likes to play football:
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P(football | girl) = 10%
The question is: What would be the probability of randomly choosing a boy from the set
of people who like to play football? What is P(boy | football)?
According to Bayes Theorem:
P (boyjfootball) = P (footballjboy) P (boy)
P (football)
(2)
Given that,
P (football) = P (footballjboy) P (boy) + P (footballjgirl) P (girl) (3)
Thus,
P (boyjfootball) = 30% 40%
30% 40% + 10% 60% =
12%
18%
=
2
3
(4)
According to the Bayes rule, the posterior probability is proportional to the product
of the likelihood and the prior probabilities. This aspect can be exploited to enhance the
detection of attacks in MANETs and reduce the false detection rates. The main objective
of the bayes rule function is to improve the efficiency of the detection.
2.7 Related Work
In this section, we present a summary of the research contributions in the areas of network
clustering and detecting attacks in MANETs. Then, we explain the problems and limitation
of the proposed models and motivate the need for our approaches.
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2.7.1 Clustering in MANET
In this section, the previous work of QOLSR and the cluster based approaches for OLSR
are reviewed.
OLSR [7] is a classical link state protocol that was adapted to fulfil the needs of ad
hoc networks. Multi-Point Relay (MPR nodes) are the base of this approach. The role of
these selected nodes is to broadcast the topology information of the network in their control
messages. In addition, the MPRs send traffic flows from source to destination.
Significantly, the overhead of TC messages will be reduced by this optimization tech-
nique. Therefore, OLSR protocol is mostly applicable in large and dense networks. Unfor-
tunately, OLSR cannot guarantee or ensure QoS since it was not designed for multimedia
purposes. To cope with this limitation, QOLSR [3] routing protocol was developed based
on OLSR where QoS has been considered. This raises the need for new metrics like delay
and bandwidth. Thus, the aim is to find a source-destination routes, but the optimal ones
that ensures the end-to-end QoS requirements. The MPR selection is based on the QoS
measurements that allow finding optimal paths in QOLSR. Multiple-metric routing criteria
were considered in order to improve the QoS of the route. The QOLSR has two main lim-
itations. MPRs are selected based on nodes bandwidth without considering nodes energy
level and connectivity which can shorten the network lifetime.
In this regard, new clustering models have been proposed based on connectivity and
energy levels. [1, 5, 13].
The HOLSR protocol was proposed in [13]. This protocol depends on the type of nodes
in the network: nodes with greater transmission potentials and ordinary nodes. Previous
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nodes work as an organized network of connected heads likely identified as mobile access
points. Whereas, ordinary nodes are arranged into different clusters where every node
discovers the head to which it should be connected. Then, the traffic should be directed
to the local cluster head and sent to the proper remote cluster head in order to reach any
remote destination.
Authors in [1] present the OLSR Tree protocol. In this approach, every node chooses
an adjacent node that have the largest number of neighbors as its parent. In this context,
the network is partitioned into a set of overlapping trees where any leaf node can be part
of different trees. Thus, clusters are formed from each tree where the root node will be the
local cluster head. A prolonged form of OLSR that establish a set of super MPRs is used
by cluster heads in order to interconnect between them. In this extended approach, each
cluster behaves as a unique super node.
To deal with the scalability issues of dense ad hoc networks, a solution that is totally
independent of the approach applied was proposed in [5]. OLSR protocol and its traditional
messages are bounded to the local clusters. Cluster heads send super topology control
messages to interconnect these clusters. These kind of messages help any source node to
locate the next hop reaching its destination. Thus, this technique is easier than the extended
OLSR method applied earlier.
Many approaches [4, 8, 9, 11] that used node’s remaining energy as a metric for the
routing protocol proved that energy consumption is reduced and the network lifetime is
prolonged. In these methods, MPR selection will depend either on a simple measure that
considers the nodes’ residual energy level or on a mixed weighted measure where nodes’
connectivity is considered along with the nodes’ residual energy [9]. Choosing the method
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relies on the physical model of nodes’ power consumption. In some methods, high costs
are assigned to links coming out from the nodes that have degraded residual energy level.
These approaches use Dijkstra’s algorithm in order to calculate the paths with the smallest
total cost (as in, [4] and [8]). Yet, other methods that select a path reducing the maximum
total energy consumed by all the nodes along the route are desired. [11].
All these proposed approaches are based on forming the clusters first, then heads are
selected. While, our model is based first, on head selection and then clusters are formed.
Clusters are connected through the selection of the best MPRs. In our previous work [6],
we have only addressed the problem of lifetime and security for OLSR. In this work, we
address the impact of clustering on QoS, and how this can affect multimedia applications
in ad hoc networks.
2.7.2 Security in MANETs
Unfortunately, QoS-OLSR is susceptible to attacks that can be launched by malicious nodes
against the network. Many attacks that can be launched against QoS-OLSR protocol were
identified. These attacks can degrade the network performance by isolating some head
nodes and clusters. The attacks are classified into two categories: Attacks by normal nodes
and attacks by MPRs. Several approaches are proposed to defend against these attacks.
[14–23]
To secure the network against collusion attack, authors in [22] suggest to alter the ex-
isting Hello message by adding the 2-hop neighbors list. Hence, a node can identify if a
forged Hello message was sent to one of its neighbors have. One of the drawbacks of this
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approach is that false alarms may be prompted when links between the nodes break if the
nodes are highly mobile.
In [23], they use the FMS-OLSR (Forced MPR Switching OLSR) algorithm to detect
collusion attack. When node X sends a HELLO message, it verifies the number of nodes
in its MPR set. If the number is 1, it verifies its 1-hop neighbor set. If node X has more
than 1 neighbor, it adds the MPR to an AvoidanceSet after waiting for the duration of an
avoidance delay. The entries are deleted from AvoidanceSet after some determined delay.
In the node isolation attack, MPR node avoids sending its TC message in order to
prevent its MPR selectors to be reachable by other nodes in the network. A countermeasure
is proposed in [14] in order to defend against this attack. The method consists of two
phases: In the first phase, each node checks whether its MPR node sends its TC message.
In the second phase, a new field named Request-value was included in the Hello message
in order to avoid the impact of this attack.
Authors in [15] use a trust analysis technique to stop a malicious node from isolating
other nodes in the network. Every node in the network should send a Hello message during
a specific period of time to prove that they belong to the network. Each node then gets
HOP-INFORMATION table, which has HELLO message sender and its 2-hop neighbors.
TOGBAD, a centralized topology graph approach, is used in [16] to protect the network
against blackhole attack. The graph is created and the number of neighbors of a node is
calculated. Then, this number is compared to the originator’s number of neighbors. If there
is a major difference between the two numbers, an alarm is triggered.
A malicious node generates control messages that state an incorrect set of links. An
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attacker can drop existing links or add non-existing links. The link spoofing attack is de-
fended in [19], where each node should advertise its two-hop neighbors in order to have
knowledge about the whole topology up to three hops and checks if there is a significant
discrepancy when the attack occurs. Moreover, SA-OLSR (Security Aware OLSR) is used
in [18] to detect link spoofing attack.
The attacking node sends TC message which claim to have another node’s identity. Au-
thors in [17] use signature and timestamp schemes to ensure authentication and protection
against identity spoofing attack, where a node misbehaves by generating incorrect Hello
or TC messages using a fake identity. The countermeasure proposed follows the following
protocol:
 The node checks the timestamp of the signature message and place it in memory.
 The node checks the signature of the TC message.
 The message is accepted and processed based on the standard OLSR specifications
for the message type when the node finds that the timestamp is fresh and the signature
is valid. If the message proved to be fraudulent, it will be dropped.
When launching the Advertised Neighbor Sequence Number (ANSN) attack, the at-
tacking node listens to a TC message addressed from a node X and records its ANSN. It
then sends a TC with a wrong originated address of that node with an ANSN value greater
than the recorded one. This attack is detected in [20] when the fraudulent TC transmits an
ANSN that is much higher than that actual TC message received from the node X.
The wormhole attack is composed of two attackers, which generate a link between them
called wormhole tunnel. The first attacker receives packets from its neighbors, copies, and
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sends them to the other attacker through the tunnel. So after this node receives the packets,
it displays them into the network. In [18], they calculate the delay between the time a node
sends a TC (Tsent) and the time the node receives the ACKTC (Treceived). The difference
between Treceived and Tsent must be less then a threshold value; else, the node will be
considered as malicious.
Moreover, authors in [21] have defended wormhole attack by computing the travel dis-
tance. If this distance is larger than the transmission range, the message may have tunneled
through the wormhole.
All the presented approaches have only addressed the attacks launched against the
OLSR model. In this work, we identify the attacks that can be launched against the QoS-
OLSR protocol and propose different detection approaches.
2.8 Conclusion
We presented in this chapter the ad hoc network characteristics, MANET and its security
concerns, cooperative watchdog approach and bayesian rule function that form our thesis.
Then, we presented the related works in the areas of clustering and detecting attacks in
MANETs. We showed that the previously proposed clustering algorithms select a large
number of MPR nodes, which can shorten network lifetime, and hence affect nodes’ avail-
able bandwidth and increase the probability of channel collision. Moreover, the existing
clustering approaches consider only nodes’ bandwidth during MPRs selection without con-
sidering other Quality of Service metrics such as energy and connectivity. Regarding the
attacks that can be launched against the QoS-OLSR protocol, nodes may act maliciously
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and lead to network disruptions that can eventually threaten the ultimate goal of the pro-
tocol. The existing approaches only detect attacks that can be launched against the OLSR
protocol. Moreover, nodes mobility and collisions reduces the accuracy of the detection
results and leads to many false positives and false negatives decisions.
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Chapter Three
A Cluster-Based Model for QoS-OLSR
Protocol
3.1 Introduction
The problem of clustering in ad hoc networks is introduced in this chapter. Many models
have been previously proposed for clustering in MANET [1,4,5,8,9,11,13]. However, the
approaches select a large number of MPR nodes, which can shorten network lifetime. Such
a problem can affect nodes’ available bandwidth and augment the possibility of channel
collision especially in large networks. In other approaches [3, 7], MPRs are selected based
on nodes’ bandwidth without considering other metrics such as energy and connectivity.
Our proposed approach is a new cluster based QOLSR algorithm that considers a tradeoff
between percentage of MPRs and QoS metrics. The goal is to form clusters and reduce the
percentage of MPRs, while satisfying the QoS metrics, thus decreasing traffic overhead,
delay and channel collision, and increasing cooperation in the network. The rest of this
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chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the cluster-based QoS-OLSR model
and presents an illustrative example in order to show how the clustering approach works.
Section 3.3 evaluates the efficiency of the cluster-based QoS-OLSR model. Finally, section
3.4 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Cluster-Based QoS-OLSR Model
In this section, we present the Quality of Service metric function of our models that are
bandwidth, connectivity index, and residual energy. Implementing these concepts will help
us to prolong network lifetime without sacrificing QoS. Our approach is recapitulated as
follows: First, optimal cluster heads are elected using the cluster head election algorithm.
Second, MPR nodes are selected by those elected head using the MPR selection algorithm,
which will form a connected network.
3.2.1 Quality of Service Metric Models
We introduce the cluster based QoS-OLSR approach in order to have a better performance
and quality of service. In the classical QOLSR, each node chooses its own MPR according
to maximum bandwidth and minimum delay. In this paper, the classical QOLSR will be
known as "without clustering" under different models according to the QoS metric used.
The models are presented in Table 1. Note that throughout this paper the QOLSR will be
called as "without clustering BOLSR".
Our proposed model is known as "with clustering" and it has four different models
according to the different QoS metrics. In the modified approach, the network is divided
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into clusters by selecting the set of optimal head clusters that can serve as MPR node.
Heads are elected according to the highest QoS Metric value. After the head election is
done, each head will elect the MPR nodes according to nodes’ QoS Metric function that
are based on the QoS parameters. By introducing clustering to the classical QOLSR, we
are distributing the energy consumption and thus increasing the network lifetime. In Table
1, we define the Quality of Service Metric function of our four models with the new metrics
and the notations used.
Table 1: Quality of Service Metric
Notations and Quality of Service Metric Function
Let i be a node in the network. Let define:
QoS(i) = Quality of Service Metric of a node
BW(i) = Available bandwidth of i
N(i) = Neighbors of i
RE(i) = Residual energy of i
Bandwidth Model (B-OLSR)
1 QoS(i) = BW (i);
Proportional Bandwidth Model (Proportional B-OLSR)
2 QoS(i) = BW (i)
N(i)
;
Bandwidth and Energy Model (BE-OLSR)
3 QoS(i) = BW (i)RE(i);
Proportional Bandwidth & Energy Model (Prop. BE-OLSR)
4 QoS(i) = BW (i)
N(i)
RE(i)
3.2.2 Cluster Head Election
An election algorithm is modeled in order to elect the optimal heads and divide the network
into distinct clusters. The algorithm works as follows: each node in the network votes for
one of its neighbor nodes having the largest Quality of Service value. Note that, if certain
node has the largest local QoS metric value, it can vote for itself to be the cluster head. This
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method provides a 1-hop clustering model where every node is only 1-hop distant from its
elected cluster head.
Cluster Head Election Algorithm
Let i be a node in the network.
1 Let k 2 N1(i) [ fig be s.t.
QoS(k) = maxfQoS(j)jj 2 N1(i) [ figg.
2 The node i votes for k.
3 MPRSet(i) = fkg.
At the end of the cluster head election process, the designated head nodes act as MPRs
for their electors. This method should be altered by including a flag in order to show which
node was assigned as a cluster head. In addition, a flag should be included presenting that
a neighbor was assigned as a head. Thus, each node will be able to know which node each
of its neighbors has elected. All the neighbors will receive information about head election
before changing their local information.
3.2.3 MPR Nodes Selection
After being designated, the cluster heads are responsible of selecting a group of optimal
MPRs. The group of MPRs combines the clusters into a connected graph. Selecting MPR
MPR - Part I: Computing the neighbor clusters
Let k be any elected cluster head.
1 the 1-hop cluster heads as
CH1(k) = fi 2 N1(k)ji has its CH ag setg:
2 the 2-hop cluster heads as
CH2(k) = fi 2 N2(k)ji has its CH ag setg:
3 the 3-hop cluster heads as
CH3(k) = fjj(9i 2 N2(k))[i voted for j]g nN1;2(k):
4 the set of cluster heads to be covered as
CH(k) = CH3(k) [
CH2(k) n fjj(9i 2 CH1(k))[j 2 N1(i)]g:
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nodes in between the 1-hop cluster heads is not required because they can reach each others
directly since they are neighbors. In addition, it is not needed to select any MPR in between
2-hop cluster heads that are connected to 1-hop cluster heads. Therefore, only the 3-hop
cluster heads problem should be covered consistently.
To cover the 2-hop cluster heads, we compute the MPR nodes in MPR-Part II:
MPR - Part II: MPR nodes for the nodes in CH2(k)
Let k be any elected cluster head.
5 While CH(k) 6= ;
6 Find l 2 CH(k) \ CH2(k) s.t.
7 The path (k; x; l) maximizes QoS(x) among all paths
connecting k to any other uncovered node.
8 MPRSet(k) = MPRSet(k) [ fxg.
9 Remove from QoS(k) all the nodes in CH2(k)
reachable from x.
Finally, the 3-hop cluster heads are selected in MPR-Part III. In this case, 2 MPRs are
needed in order to reach any 3-hop cluster head.
MPR - Part III: MPR nodes for the nodes in CH3(k)
Let k be any elected cluster head.
10 While QoS(k) \ CH3(k) 6= ;
11 Find l 2 QoS(k) \ CH3(k) s.t.
12 The path (k; x; y; l) maximizesmin(QoS(x); QoS(y)) among
all paths connecting k to any other uncovered node.
13 If there are two such paths, take the first one
in the lexicographic order.
14 MPRSet(k) = MPRSet(k) [ fxg.
15 Remove from CH(k) all the nodes in CH3(k)
that can be reached from x.
The correctness of this part should be verified properly. Suppose that MPR node x is
selected by the cluster head k, then MPR node y should be selected by cluster head l in
order to assure that heads k and l are connected.
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We should state that the proposed approach is competitive. Therefore, each cluster head
must have different ways in order to connect to its neighbor heads using the MPR selection
algorithm stated in Part II or the one stated in Part III.
3.2.4 Illustrative Example
An illustrative example is given to show how the head election and the MPR selection
algorithms work. Figure 3 presents a network with twenty nodes and Table 2 gives the
Quality of Service Metric value of each node using the Proportional BE-OLSR Model
(refer to Table 1). To find the Quality of Service metric of each node in the network,
the residual energy which is a random value between 500 and 550 (refer to Table 2) is
divided by connectivity index and multiplied by bandwidth. Once the Hello messages
are broadcasted, a node votes for its neighbor with the maximal Quality of Service metric.
Referring to the Head Election Algorithm, nodes: 3, 4, 5, and 15 are elected as head clusters
(MPRs).
Fig. 3: Network example
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Table 2: The Quality of Service Metric Using the Proportional BE-OLSR Model
Node n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 n8 n9 n10
QoS Metric 370:8 297:3 500:2 479:4 320:1 338:7 231:1 220:4 205:6 246:4
Node n11 n12 n13 n14 n15 n16 n17 n18 n19 n20
QoS Metric 250:6 193:1 127:2 159:9 398:9 109:9 101:5 89:3 96:2 117:7
After being elected, the cluster heads select the MPRs nodes that connect all heads
together. We will consider node 15 in clusterD to illustrate our example. First, discovering
the neighbor cluster heads for node 15 is required. Referring to MPR-Part I, we need to
find the 1-hop away cluster head, CH1, the 2 hop away cluster head, CH2, and the 3-hop
away cluster head, CH3. So, CH1(15)= since there is no 1  hop cluster head connected
to node 15. CH2(15) = 5 since node 5 is a 2-hop cluster head to node 15, and similarly
for CH3(15)=3 and CH3(15)=4.
The second step is to find the optimal path that will connect the 2-hop cluster heads
that are node 15 and node 5. Node 8 and node 16 are common neighbors for these 2 head
nodes, but according to MPR-Part II Algorithm, node 8 is chosen as the MPR node since
it has a better QoS metric value than node 16. Now, we need to find the optimal path for
the 3-hop cluster heads referring to MPR-Part III. There are two choices to connect head
node 15 with head node 3, either through {node 11, node 19} or {node 17, node 19}. Head
node 15 chooses the path {node 11, node 19} which has the maximal QoS metric value.
However, head node 15 would choose only node 11 as MPR node and, likewise, head node
3 chooses node 19 as MPR node. Similarly, the optimal path with {nodes 8 and 3} to reach
cluster head node 4 is found.
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3.3 Simulation Results
Matlab-8.0 was used to simulate with clustering and without clustering QOLSR to com-
pare between the novel cluster-based QOLSR and the classical one (without clustering).
The simulation is divided into five subsections. The first subsection shows the percentage
of selected MPR nodes in the two scenarios: with clustering and without clustering models.
The second part presents the percentage of alive nodes in these models. The third subsec-
tion shows the path lengths in the models that represent delay in the network. Finally, the
bandwidth average difference for the models is presented to show the quality of service in
the network. The simulation parameters are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Simulation area 500 500 m
Number of nodes Between 30 and 70
Transmission range 125 m
Residual energy Random value in [500::550] Joules
Packet Size 1 kb
Energy Per Packet 0:0368 J
Idle Time Random value in [0::1]
Link Bandwidth 2Mbps
Available Bandwidth Idle T ime Link Bandwidth
3.3.1 Percentage of MPR nodes
In Figure 4, it is significant that the clustered models decrease the percentage of selected
MPRs. The cluster heads are included in the set of MPRs and behave as specialized MPR
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Fig. 4: Percentage of MPR Nodes: (a) B-OLSR (b) Proportional B-OLSR (c) BE-OLSR (d) 
Propor-tional BE-OLSR
nodes. In fact, the outcome is ordinary because a small number of special nodes are re-
sponsible of selecting the MPR nodes. Therefore, clustering techniques must decrease the
congestion level and must be more convenient for large networks.
Comparing the four models, obviously in Figure 4, the “with clustering” BE-OLSR model
has the minimum percentage of MPR nodes, since these nodes are selected according to the
two parameters that are bandwidth and energy without being proportional to the number of
neighbor nodes.
3.3.2 Network Lifetime
The energy consumption at node i is computed using the following parameters:
 BW (i): Available bandwidth at node i.
 RE(i): Residual energy of node i.
 EN(i): Energy consumed by node i.
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 Packet size.
 Energy per Packet.
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Fig. 5: Percentage of of alive nodes over time: (a) B-OLSR (b) Proportional B-OLSR (c) BE-
OLSR (d) Proportional BE-OLSR
In Figure 5, we show the percentage of alive nodes and how the energy drain for a
70 nodes network for all the models. The Energy Consumption (EN) is calculated using
Equation 5. This will be done by finding the total number of packets the node iwill transfer.
This value is achieved by dividing the available bandwidth at node i by the mean packet
size 1kb. Then, we have to multiply the total number of packets transferred by the energy
per packet which is 0:0368J according to the simulation parameters table (refer to equation
5). The residual energy is decreased by the value of Energy consumption. (refer to equation
6)
EN(i) = (BW (i) = Packet size) Energy per Packet J (5)
New RE(i) = RE(i)   EN(i) J (6)
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As expected, the clustered models in Figure 5 prolong the network lifetime compared
to the without clustering models because we have less number of selected MPRs. It is
significant that the with clustering proportional B-OLSR (see Figure 5,a) has the worst
network life time among all clustered models, whereas, with clustering BE-OLSR shows
the best result overtime compared to others. The models that depend on the residual energy
prolong the network lifetime because the MPR nodes are chosen based on the residual
energy of nodes. Also, the concept of clustering helped to reduce the energy consumption
by selecting a set of specialized nodes.
3.3.3 End-to-End Average Delay in the Network
30 40 50 60 70
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Number of Nodes
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 P
a
th
 L
e
n
g
th
With Clustering B-OLSR
Without Clustering B-OLSR
30 40 50 60 70
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Number of Nodes
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 P
a
th
 L
e
n
g
th
With Clustering Proportional B-OLSR
Without Clustering Proportional B-OLSR
30 40 50 60 70
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Number of Nodes
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 P
a
th
 L
e
n
g
th
With Clustering BE-OLSR
Without Clustering BE-OLSR
30 40 50 60 70
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Number of Nodes
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 P
a
th
 L
e
n
g
th
With Clustering Proportional BE-OLSR
Without Clustering Proportional BE-OLSR
Fig. 6: Average Path Length with and without Clustering: (a) B-OLSR (b) Proportional B-
OLSR (c) BE-OLSR (d) Proportional BE-OLSR
Another aspect to consider, in this analysis, is the end-to-end delay in the network.
Figure 6 represents the source-destination path length of the four different models “with
clustering” and “without clustering”. The path length is presented by the average number
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of hops between source and destination. The path with the best Quality of Service metric
is selected as the source-destination optimal path. In each figure, we show a comparison
of the average path length for both models.The “with Clustering” and “without Cluster-
ing” Models showed similar results. Thus, to differentiate between the performances of
the models, another criterion should be used. According to the results of the simulation,
the BE-OLSR model with clustering gives better performance for the network lifetime and
should be favored over other cluster based models.
3.3.4 The Bandwidth Average Difference
Table 4: Bandwidth Average Difference
Models
Transmission Ranges
100 150 200
without clustering B-OLSR 0% 0% 0%
with clustering B-OLSR 0% 0% 0%
without clustering Prop. B-OLSR 10:55% 3:08% 4:9%
with clustering Prop. B-OLSR 10:6% 4:22% 2:59%
without clustering BE-OLSR 0:04% 0:15% 0:02%
with clustering BE-OLSR 0:09% 0:19% 0:09%
without clustering Prop. BE-OLSR 9:17% 5:88% 4:89%
with clustering Prop. BE-OLSR 9:24% 6:2% 3:42%
The bandwidth average difference is one of the aspects that we can consider in our
models. It is the percentage average of the difference between the optimal bandwidth and
the bandwidth currently available in the network. As the percentage decrease, the quality of
service in the network improves. Table 4 represents the percentage average difference for
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a 70 nodes network for the two scenarios: without clustering and with clustering. Accord-
ing to this table, the with clustering B-OLSR and without clustering B-OLSR have zero
average difference because the optimal path is chosen according to the optimal bandwidth
path. Other clustered approaches showed slightly more percentage average difference, es-
pecially the with Clustering BE-OLSR which is more by less than 0:1% , but it have better
network lifetime and delay. Thus, it should be preferred over the B-OLSR. Choosing the
best model regarding the percentage average difference, depends on the application. If the
application is related to multimedia services that are error tolerated and delay not tolerated,
the percentage average difference loses its importance compared to delay. Whereas in data
services applications, errors are not acceptable so percentage average difference should be
considered.
In Summary, based on the results in the above subsections, we are able to show that
the novel cluster-based approaches are able to prolong network lifetime by selecting less
number of MPRs, thus decreasing traffic overhead, delay, channel collision, and increasing
cooperation in the network. On the other hand, comparing the clustered models with each
others, we conclude that the energy is an essential metric that must be considered while
selecting the MPRs. The cluster-based BE-OLSR model showed a marginal impact on
average difference, whereas a large impact on the network lifetime. Therefore, the cluster-
based approach must be preferred over the classical one taking into consideration nodes’
energy.
39
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a cluster based QoS-OLSR protocol which considers the trade-
off between prolonging the ad hoc network lifetime and QoS assurance. We may accom-
plish the following by (1) decreasing the percentage of Multi-Point Relay (MPR nodes)
without sacrificing the QoS and (2) observing the connectivity index, residual energy level,
and bandwidth of the MPRs. Head and MPRs selection algorithms are first presented.
Moreover, a comparison between the "without clustering" and "with clustering" models
was presented. The comparison addressed the percentage of MPR nodes, percentage of
alive nodes in the network, path length which reflects the delay and quality of service.
Simulation results showed that the "with clustering" models, in general, lead to a better
results compared to the classical QOLSR (i.e., without clustering). Our model was able
to reduce the number of MPR nodes by 27%. Moreover, the "with clustering" BE-OLSR
considered the tradeoff between delay, network lifetime and QoS. The model shows much
better results in network lifetime; the number of alive nodes increased by 16%. In addi-
tion the "with clustering" model shows better results in path length and very close result in
terms of bandwidth with average difference of 3%.
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Chapter Four
Detecting Attacks in a Mobile
Cluster-Based QoS-OLSR Protocol
4.1 Introduction
This chapter tackles the problem of attacks against our clustering QoS-OLSR protocol pro-
posed in chapter 3. According to this protocol, normal and MPR nodes may act maliciously
and lead to network disruptions that can eventually threaten the ultimate goal of the pro-
tocol. As a solution, we identify the attacks that can be launched against our QoS-OLSR
model and we propose a cooperative detection approach that is based on cooperation be-
tween watchdogs. Then, we add Bayes rule to our cooperative approach in order to improve
the detection rate and reduce false positives. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows:
Section 4.2 identifies the security attacks in a QoS-OLSR network and presents an illus-
trative example to show how the proposed model works. Section 4.3 identifies the attacks
that can be launched against the cluster-based model. Section 4.4 proposes the bayesian
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cooperative detection approach that is used to detect the attacks, improve the detection and
reduce the false rates. Section 4.5 evaluates the performance of the the bayesian cooperative
detection approach. Finally, section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Security Attacks in a QoS-OLSR Network
In this section, we will first present the QoS-OLSR network through an illustrative example
in order to present the attacks. Then, we will describe the elements of QoS-OLSR needed to
explore security issues. In addition, we will identify the attacks that can affect our model,
the clustered QoS-OLSR, and we will provide a scenario that shows how each attack is
launched.
4.2.1 Illustrative Example: QoS-OLSR
To review the cluster head election and the MPR selection presented, figure 7 presents a 
network involving twenty nodes:
Table 5 gives the Quality of Service Metric value of each node (refer to Table 5). Once
Hello messages are broadcasted, a node votes for its neighbor with the maximal QoS Met-
ric value. Nodes 3, 4, 5, and 15 were elected as head nodes.
After being elected, the cluster head nodes select the MPR nodes that connect all heads
together. Node 15 in cluster D is considered to illustrate the example. First, discovering
the neighbor cluster heads for node 15 is required. The 1-hop cluster head, CH1, the 2-hop
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Fig. 7: Attack Network example
Table 5: The Quality of Service Metric Using the Hybrid QoS-OLSR Model
Node n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 n8 n9 n10
QoS Metric 370:8 297:3 500:2 479:4 320:1 338:7 231:1 220:4 205:6 246:4
Node n11 n12 n13 n14 n15 n16 n17 n18 n19 n20
QoS Metric 250:6 193:1 127:2 159:9 398:9 109:9 101:5 89:3 96:2 117:7
cluster head, CH2, and the 3-hop cluster head, CH3 were found. CH1(15 )= since there
is no 1-hop cluster head connected to node 15, CH2(15)=5 since node 5 is a 2-hop cluster
head to node 15, similarly CH3(15)=3 and CH3(15)=4. The second step was to find the
optimal path that will connect the 2-hop cluster heads that are node 15 and node 5. Node 8
and node 16 are common neighbors for these 2 head nodes, but node 8 was chosen as the
MPR node since it has a better QoS Metric value than node 16. The third step was to find
the optimal path for the 3-hop cluster heads. There are two choices to connect head node 15
with head node 3, either {node 11, node 19} or {node 17, node 19}. Head node 15 chooses
the path {node 11, node 19} which has the maximal QoS Metric value. However, head
node 15 would choose only node 11 as an MPR node and, likewise, head node 3 chooses
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node 19 as an MPR node. Similarly, the optimal path {node 8, node 3} to cluster head node
4 was found.
4.2.2 Identifying the Attacks
We will start by describing the messages that are generated in the network.
 Hello Message: The Hello messages are transmitted periodically, each time the net-
work is created and the nodes change places. They are used in order to gain informa-
tion about the node’s neighbors. These messages are responsible of sensing neigh-
bors and selecting MPRs. Every node’s Hello message includes its own address, a
list of its 1-hop neighbors and a list of its MPR set.
 TCMessage: MPR nodes must generate a TCmessage periodically in order to spread
topology information each time the network topology changes. The aim of TC mes-
sages is to be distributed throughout the network and they are forwarded only by
MPR nodes. A set of bi-directional links between each node and its neighbors is
constituted using TC message.
Now, we will identify the two attacks that can be launched against QoS-OLSR. The
malicious node can perform the attack by including false information in its messages. This
node does not want to be selected as a cluster head node in order to not be watched by other
nodes. Thus, cluster head nodes are considered as trusted nodes. Attacks may be launched
by normal nodes or by MPR nodes.
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4.2.2.1 Attacks Launched by Normal Nodes
A node should be an MPR node in order to forward TC messages to other nodes in the
network. A normal node can spoof the identity of an MPR node in order to launch some
attacks.
Identity spoofing attack: This attack can be launched by a normal node that will send
TC messages declaring that it has an MPR node’s identity. In figure 7, consider that node
16 sends TC messages, claiming to have the identity of another node (node 12).The node
states incorrect links to the network. Nodes 15 and 5 will predict reachability to node 12
via TC messages.
Wormhole attack: A normal node can also copy the message of an MPR node and send
it to another attacker through the wormhole tunnel in order to launch the wormhole attack.
Consider in figure 7 that node 15 broadcasts its Hello message. Then, node 17 (the first
attacker) copies this message and sends it to node 19 through the vortex built. Node 19
receives the message and replays it.
4.2.2.2 Attacks Launched by MPR Nodes
MPR nodes can also launch the above two attacks.
Identity spoofing attack: This attack can also be performed by an MPR node that will
send TC messages claiming to have the identity of another MPR node.
In figure 7, consider that node 8 sends TC messages, claiming to have the identity of
another MPR node (node 12). The node claims incorrect links to the network. Nodes 15,
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5, 11, and 2 will announce reachability to node 12 through their TC messages.
Wormhole attack: An MPR node can also copy the message of another MPR node and
send it to the second attacker through the wormhole tunnel in order to launch the wormhole
attack. Consider in figure 8 that node 15 broadcasts its Hello message.
Fig. 8: Wormhole Attack
Then, node 11 (the first attacker) copies this message and sends it to node 19 through
the vortex built. Node 19 receives the message and replays it. When node 3 receives the
message replayed, node 3 considers node 15 as a 1-hop neighbor. After a while, a symmet-
rical relationship can be established between nodes 15 and 3. Once this link is established,
nodes 15 and 3 are very likely to select each other as MPRs. This will lead to an exchange
of TC messages and data packets through the wormhole tunnel.a˘This lead to a transmission
of erroneous information, disruption of routing and loss of connectivity between clusters.
Malicious nodes, normal or MPR nodes, can severely degrade the network performance
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by isolating some head nodes and clusters, since communication between nodes depends
on TC messages exchanged. Thus, identity spoofing attack will lead to disconnected clus-
ters. A disconnected network will yield to a decrease in the network lifetime leading to
more delay in the network. In addition, wormhole attack can create false links in the net-
work leading to false path selection.
4.3 Cooperative Detection Model
We will first present how the watchdog detection is working. Second, we will show how
this detection is improved using Bayes’ rule function added to the cooperative watchdog
model.
4.3.1 How watchdog is working
4.3.1.1 Identity spoofing attack
We will consider 3 cases where a malicious node launches the identity spoofing attack. In
our new model, each node saves its 1-hop neighbors’ list in order to identify its neighbors.
Thus, as we can see in the scenarios below, the watchdog will decide whether the node is
misbehaving or not by comparing the information it receives with its neighbors’ list.
 Scenario 1: Consider that node 16 forwards its TC message to a node in the network
claiming to have the identity of node 12. Nodes 15, 8, and 5 which are neighbors
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with node 16 will validate the identity of this node. As nodes 15, 8 and 5 are not
neighbors to node 12, they will be able to detect that node 16 is misbehaving.
 Scenario 2: Consider that node 2 forwards a TC message to a node in the network
claiming to have the identity of node 8. Nodes 3, 4, and 5 which are neighbors with
node 2 will validate if this node has the true identity. As nodes 3 and 5 are neighbors
with node 8, they will not be able to distinguish the identity of the malicious node.
Thus, they will not be able to detect the attack. Whereas, node 4 is able to detect that
node 2 is an attacking node because it does not have node 8 in its neighbors’ list.
 Scenario 3: Consider that node 8 forwards a TC message into the network claiming
to have the identity of node 12. Nodes 15, 5, 11, and 2 will detect that node 8 is an
attacker because they are not neighbors with node 12. Whereas, node 3 will not be
able to detect the attack.
4.3.1.2 Wormhole attack
We will consider also a scenario where two attackers launch the wormhole attack and show
how watchdogs are able to detect this attack. Consider that node 4 at source wants to send
a message to node 15 at destination. A malicious node, node 7 copies the message of the
source node 4 and sends it to another attacker, node 11 through the wormhole tunnel (7-12-
19-11). Node 11 will replay the message. When the receiver, node 15 gets the message, it
will consider that this is the shortest path in the network and select this route. But in fact,
there are shorter routes to reach the destination: (4-2-8-15) and (4-3-8-15). The watchdogs,
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MPR nodes which are neighbors with the candidate nodes at source and destination, will
check if an attack is performed. Nodes 4 and 12 will watch node 7; and nodes 8, 15, and
19 will monitor node 11. The monitors at source and destination will check, respectively, if
there is a shortest path or equivalent path with larger QoS. If so, then the attack is detected.
4.3.2 How to improve detection
We are going to present cooperative watchdogs that improve the detection. Then, we will
add Bayes’ rule function to the cooperative model.
4.3.2.1 Cooperative watchdogs
Watchdogs are responsible of monitoring the behavior of the candidate node. The watch-
dogs cooperate together in order to give better results. Therefore, the final decision should
be based on an aggregation between more than one watchdog node decision.
4.3.2.2 Posterior belief function
The main objective of the Posterior belief function is to have a trusted detection of attacks
in the network. This method increases the efficiency of detection because it is based on a
prior knowledge.
In our case, the type of a node sending TC message can be selected from a set  = 
fMalicious(M); Normal(N)g:
Bayesian Equilibrium, proposed in [22], dictates the performance of the candidate node 
depending on its type . By observing the performance of the sender, the watchdogs can
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compute the posterior belief evaluation function (iji) using the following Bayes’ rule
(refer to equation 9):
(iji) = (i)P (iji)=i"(i)P (iji) (9)
where (i) > 0 and P (iji) is the probability that strategy i is observed given the type
 of the node i. It is calculated as follows:
P (Attackji = M) = Em O + Fm(1 O) (10)
P (Attackji = N) = Fm (11)
where O is the probability of attack determined by the watchdog node. Fm is the false rate
generated by the watchdog and Em is the expected detection rate. We define the intruderŠs
pure strategy as i = fAttack;NotAttackg.
We implemented the following algorithm that computes the probability of detecting the
attack based on the cooperative watchdogs’ decisions and reputations (Algorithm I):
The monitoring nodes are the MPR nodes that are neighbors with the candidate node
sending the message. Each watchdog will now check if it is neighbor with the spoofed
node as we can see in Algorithm I. If it is not neighbor with the spoofed node, then it
will directly know that an attack is launched. However, the watchdog might be a neighbor
with the spoofed node. Therefore, it will make a false prediction about the malicious node,
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Algorithm I: Identity Spoofing and Wormhole Attack
Detection Algorithm
Let P be the Probability of detection
Let w be the Watchdogs’ list
Let MN be the Malicious Node
Let SN be the Spoofed Node
Let  be the type of the node; i = M(Malicious) or N(Normal)
Let rep(w(i)) be the reputation of each watchdog i;
rep(w(i)) between 0 and 1
Let sumrep be the sum of reputations of the watchdogs;
sumrep =
P
i rep(w(i))
For i = 1 to length(w)
If w(i) and MN are neighbors
If w(i) and SN are neighbors Or shorter path not detected
If w(i) = M
P = P + rep(w(i))
End
Else
If w(i) = N
P = P + rep(w(i))
End
End
End
End
P = P/sumrep
and the attack is launched. In addition, the watchdog can itself be malicious. So, it will
behave improperly, listing the normal nodes as malicious ones and the attackers as normal
ones. Therefore, the final decision should be based on an aggregation between more than
one watchdog’s decision. A weight is added to each decision depending on the reputation
value associated with each watchdog because the reputation represents how much a node is
trustworthy. The reputation is a value between 0 and 1. When head nodes and MPR nodes
are selected, reputation values are given to each node depending on their trustworthiness.
The highest values are given to the most trusted nodes (head nodes), then to MPR nodes,
and finally to normal nodes.
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As for the wormhole attack, the monitors at source and destination will check, respec-
tively, if there is a shorter path or equivalent path with larger QoS. If so, then the attack
is detected if the node was normal and the decision of each monitor will be added with its
reputation weight to the detection rate. If the watchdogs were malicious or were not able
to find a shorter route, they will not contribute in detecting the attack.
4.4 Simulation results
Matlab-8.0 was used to simulate the effect of the attacks and the detection algorithm ap-
plied to the clustering QoS-OLSR model. The first subsection shows the percentage of
disconnected clusters in QoS-OLSR model due to identity spoofing and wormhole attacks.
The second part presents the probability of detecting the two attacks and the false rate given
different percentages of attackers. The simulation parameters are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Simulation area 500 500 m2
Number of nodes Between 30 and 70
Transmission range 125 m
Residual energy Random value in [500:::550] J
Packet Size 1 kb
Energy Per Packet 0:0368 J
Idle Time Random value in [0:::1]
Link Bandwidth 2Mbps
Available Bandwidth Idle Time  Link Bandwidth
Direction Random value in [0:::2pi]
Speed Random value in [1:::10]
Em 0.8
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4.4.1 Effect of Identity Spoofing and Wormhole Attacks on the Net-
work
A malicious node performing the identity spoofing attack or two attackers that launch the
wormhole attack can lead to disconnected clusters in the network. Figure 9 presents the
percentage of disconnected clusters when 10% of the nodes are attackers. The attack was
launched every time the topology is changed and the average number of disconnected clus-
ters was calculated for different number of nodes in the network. We can realize that the
attack has affected the network since more than 60% of the clusters have been disconnected.
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Fig. 9: Percentage of disconnected clusters with 10% attackers: (a) Identity Spoofing At-
tack (b) Wormhole Attack
Figure 10 presents the percentage of disconnected clusters with different percentages
of attackers in the network. The average number of disconnected clusters was calculated
for 30 nodes in the network. It is obvious that the percentage of disconnected clusters reach
around 80% when the percentage of attackers increase to 50% of the nodes in the network.
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Fig. 10: Percentage of disconnected clusters with different percentage of attackers: (a) Identity
Spoofing Attack (b) Wormhole Attack
4.4.2 Probability of Detecting Attacks and False Rate With Different
Percentage of Attackers
Figure 11 shows the percentage of detected attacks. The detection percentage is simulated
along with the corresponding false detection percentage (in figure 12) for the two attacks
with and without posterior belief function given different percentage of attackers. Given
that 10% of the nodes are attackers, we can realize that posterior belief function provides
more efficient results. 77% of the malicious nodes corresponding to identity spoofing at-
tack were detected using the cooperative watchdog-based model with the posterior belief
function; whereas, around 70% of the attackers were detected without the posterior belief
function. Moreover, around 88% of the wormhole attacks were detected using the cooper-
ative watchdog-based model with the posterior belief function; and, 80% of the attackers
were detected without the posterior belief function:
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Fig. 11: Detection percentage with different percentage of attackers: (a) Identity Spoofing At-
tack (b) Wormhole Attack
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Fig. 12: False detection percentage with different percentage of attackers: (c) Identity Spoofing
Attack (d) Wormhole Attack
In Summary, based on the simulations, we proved that malicious nodes affect the net-
work negatively by increasing the percentage of disconnected clusters. Thus, we need a
detection model in order to stop the misbehaving nodes from perturbing the network. Our
detection model that is based on the cooperative watchdogs’ reputation concept along with
posterior belief function demonstrates good results regarding the detection of malicious
nodes.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have tackled the problem of malicious nodes in Mobile Ad Hoc Net-
works. We showed how these nodes can lead to network disruptions that can eventually
threaten the ultimate goal of the protocol. As a solution, we identified the attacks that can
be launched against our QoS-OLSR model and we proposed a bayesian cooperative detec-
tion approach that is able to (1) improve the watchdogs’ detection by using cooperation and
(2) reduce the false detection rates by using Bayes function. The detection is done first us-
ing the an aggregation function where all the watchdogs cooperate with each others in order
to make the final decision, and then by adding posterior belief function to this approach.
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Simulation results show that the use of the Bayes’ rule function along with the cooperative
watchdog model improves the detection rates(7% to 15%) and reduces the false positives.
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Chapter Five
Conclusion
The multimedia QOLSR was proposed to handle multimedia applications over ad hoc net-
works. The MPRs are selected based on nodes bandwidth and delay without considering
nodes’ residual energy which can affect network lifetime. As a solution, we proposed
in chapter 3 different models based on the clustering concept with different QoS metric.
Such models will reduce the channel collision and increase the throughput. The head and
MPRs selection algorithms are presented. Moreover, a comparison between the "without
clustering" and "with clustering" models was presented. The comparison addressed the
percentage of MPR nodes, percentage of alive nodes in the network, path length which re-
flects the delay and quality of service. Simulation results showed that the "with clustering"
models, in general, lead to a better results compared to the classical QOLSR (i.e., without
clustering). Moreover, the "with clustering" BE-OLSR was able to deal with the tradeoff
between network lifetime, delay and QoS. The model shows much better results in network
lifetime and path length and very close result in terms of bandwidth with average difference
of 3%.
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However, the cluster-based models are highly vulnerable to security attacks. We have
identified two attacks in chapter 4: Identity spoofing and wormhole attacks. These attacks
can degrade the network performance by isolating some head nodes and clusters. Thus,
a bayesian cooperative detection technique was proposed in order to detect these attacks.
As we have shown in chapter 4, the percentage of disconnected clusters has reached 80%
with 50% of the nodes being malicious. To deal with this issue, we have presented a novel
detection approach based on cooperation between watchdogs. The detection was then en-
hanced by adding posterior belief function. Our simulation results show that posterior
belief function increases the true detection and decreases the false detection rates. 77% of
the malicious nodes corresponding to identity spoofing attack were detected using the co-
operative watchdog-based model with the posterior belief function; whereas, around 70%
of the attackers were detected without the posterior belief function. As for the wormhole
attack, 88% of the malicious nodes were detected using the cooperative watchdog-based
model with the posterior belief function; whereas, around 80% of the attackers were de-
tected without the posterior belief function.
In summary, the main contributions of our thesis are:
 Reducing the percentage of MPRs while maintaining the Quality of Service.
 Prolonging the network lifetime and reducing the energy consumption by selecting a
set of specialized nodes.
 Identifying attacks that can be launched against our models and detecting the mali-
cious nodes in the network
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 Improving the detection rate by using bayesian cooperative watchdog model and
reducing the false detection rates
This thesis presented the problem of clustering in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks and iden-
tified malicious nodes that can launch attacks against the network. Many research topics
emerging from this work may be continued. In fact, malicious nodes in the network can
perform other types of attacks against our QoS-OLSR network(e.g., add link and drop link
attacks). These nodes would degrade the network performance considerably. Moreover,
choosing all the nodes to serve as watchdogs consumes a lot of time and energy. Therefore,
there should be a tradeoff between the number of monitors and the time/energy consump-
tion. Our future work will be identifying and detecting other attacks that can harm the
network, and taking different percentages of watchdogs that are responsible of detecting
the malicious action in order to save time and energy consumption.
The following is the list of publications derived from the thesis work:
 "Detecting attacks in QoS-OLSR protocol".IWCMC 2013: 1126-1131
 "A cluster-based model for QoS-OLSR protocol".IWCMC 2011: 1099-1104
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